Individuals investing in a Venture Capital Trust IPO listed on the London Stock Exchange receive a number of conditional tax incentives; the time related nature of the conditions can create a "lock in effect". By deriving a dynamic model of the value of these incentives we examine how they influence investors' pricing and trading decisions. This contributes to the ongoing tax capitalisation debate in two ways: first, in calculating the magnitude of the lock in effect without reference to underlying shareholder records; second, in providing an approach which can be used in thinly traded quote-driven markets -by focusing on changes in the bid-ask spread, as opposed to mid-prices. Our results confirm the existence of tax capitalisation and tax induced trading consistent with changes in the present value of the incentives.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines whether conditional tax incentives influence investors' pricing and trading decisions. Individuals investing in a Venture Capital Trust (VCT) IPO listed on the London Stock Exchange receive a number of conditional tax incentives including, most significantly, "investment relief" -an income tax rebate based on the sum initially invested. By design, investors are locked in for a "required holding period". If the shares are sold within the required holding period then a repayment of the rebate can arise. This paper derives a model of the present value of the conditional tax incentive during the currency of the required holding period, and then tests empirically a number of predictions based on this model. The study contributes to the ongoing debate concerning the influence of investor level taxes on asset pricing and trading patterns.
Whilst there is considerable empirical evidence supporting the view that investor level taxes are reflected in asset prices, i.e. tax capitalisation, it is not necessarily held unanimously. Further, there remains considerable controversy as to the extent of tax capitalisation. 1 In a recent series of papers Harris and Kemsley (1999) , Harris, Hubbard and Kemsley (2001) and Collins and Kemsley (2000) conclude that dividend taxes are fully reflected in share prices, independent of firms' dividend policy. On the assumption that dividend payments are the only means by which retained earnings can be returned to shareholders, the future dividend tax liability, which is independent of 1 The literature concerning the relative valuation of "high" and "low" dividend paying firms is not necessarily relevant in a UK setting. Prior to 1988, the top marginal rate on (realised) capital gains was below that of dividend income. In 1988, the marginal rates of personal level taxation on dividends and (realised) capital gains were equalised (Ashton, 1991) . Since 1997, marginal rates of income tax have varied by income source. For example, the starting, lower and higher rates applying currently to dividend income are 10%, 10% and 32.5%, whilst the equivalent rates for capital gains are 10%, 20% and 40% -thereby inducing a preference for dividend income (subject to prior utilisation of modest taxfree allowances in respect of income and capital gains). the actual timing of any future dividend payments, is capitalised within or deducted from the current share price. In effect, investors bear the tax either "implicitly" (in receiving a reduced price when selling their shares) or "explicitly" (when dividends are received). This view of full capitalisation has been challenged in a number of recent papers, for example Dhaliwal, Erickson, Frank and Banyi (2003) and Hanlon, Myers and Shevlin (2003) . These papers conclude that the extent of tax capitalisation is a function of firms' dividend policy -a conclusion consistent with the recent empirical evidence, e.g. Dhaliwal, Erickson and Trezevant (1999) and Seida (2001) , which supports the existence of tax-induced dividend clienteles. Guenther and Sansing (2002) reconcile the full-and partial-capitalisation perspectives by demonstrating that the impact of dividend tax on firm valuation is conditional upon the "age or status of the firm".
An examination of the impact of conditional tax incentives has parallels in the analysis of capital gains tax and asset pricing. Miller (1997) argues that the effective rate of taxes on capital gains may be relatively low due to gains being taxed on a realisation basis, the availability of tax sheltering schemes and the tax free capital gains "uplift" on death.
2 Constantinides (1983) assumes that trading strategies based on short selling can avoid a taxable gain arising on share disposal, but Poterba (1987) reports that a large proportion of investors do not follow such strategies owing to transaction costs and market restrictions on short selling. Empirical evidence does suggest that capital gains taxes matter in valuation. In a general setting, Collins and Kemsley (2000) find evidence consistent with capitalisation of capital gains tax (in that firm valuation appears to be reduced by the future capital gains tax payable on future retained profits). A more specific effect can arise when the taxation of gains is limited to realised gains, thereby providing shareholders with an incentive to defer the realization of a gain, i.e. a "lock in effect". Klein (2001) demonstrates that potential sellers of shares with an unrealized gain will demand a higher price than they would have done for shares without any such unrealised gain -in order to cover the capital gains tax liability which would crystallize on sale. Examining price reaction around an unexpected reduction in the length of the capital gains holding period, Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2002) document empirical evidence consistent with Klein (2001) . Announcement date abnormal returns were on average negative for those (IPO) firms benefiting most from the change. Inconsistent with a tax explanation, however, the losses were reversed almost immediately -in fact, the following day.
Earlier work by Landsman and Shackelford (1995) on the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout confirmed that shareholders with higher unrealised gains demanded higher prices (the authors' access to confidential shareholder records allowing them to observe directly shareholders' unrealized or locked-in gains. In order to identify shares trading at an unrealised gain in the absence of access to shareholder records, Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2002) follow Reese (1998) in focusing on recent IPOs and assume no change in the initial shareholding distribution.
Our study contributes to the above literature principally in two respects. First, by calculating the magnitude of the lock in effect with certainty yet without reference to underlying shareholder records 3 -which allows examination of a broader sample of firms than would be likely to be available were access to confidential shareholders' records required. Second, by focusing on changes in the bid-ask spread and, 3 Assuming timely compliance with tax reporting requirements.
therefore, providing a general approach to investigating lock in effects -which may be used in thinly traded quote-driven markets and removes the need for a change in (mid) price as evidence of tax capitalisation when examining, for example, the impact of legislative changes. Existing approaches require informationally efficient prices, thereby restricting their application.
Our results confirm the existence of tax capitalisation and tax-induced trading. They may be summarized as follows. First, VCT bid-ask spreads evolve over time in a way consistent with investment relief being capitalised, and the bid-ask spread increases as the present value of the investment relief increases. As the present value increases over time, VCT shareholders require an increasingly higher price if they are to sell within the required holding period and, thus, forfeit the investment relief. Potential secondary market purchasers, however, are not entitled to investment relief and are only willing to pay, therefore, a price that is independent of any investment relief consideration. Second, VCT spreads fall significantly and the number of customer bargains increases significantly following the end of the required holding period, consistent with the cessation of the lock in effect. Third, spread is greater for VCTs with a three-year as opposed to a five-year required holding period -consistent with the present value of the investment relief being higher the shorter the holding period.
And fourth, VCT spread and volume traded are, respectively, greater than and less than spread and volume traded for a non-VCT comparator sample -for which comparator sample, in the absence of specific tax incentives, there is no tax-related required holding period. Overall these results are consistent with Landsman and Shackelford (1995) , Kline (2001) and Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2002) .
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses VCTs, the method of their issue and associated taxation regulation; Section III develops a theoretical model for the valuation of VCT investment relief; Section IV describes the data, hypothesis and research method; Section V reports and discusses the results; and Section VI concludes.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Legislation establishing VCTs was included in the UK Finance Act 1995, and the first VCT was created in November 1995. The term "trust" is, strictly, a misnomersince, in order to be approved as VCTs under the Finance Act 1995, they are required to be public limited companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange (although they are themselves normally restricted to investing in unquoted shares). Approval under the Act results in two distinct sets of tax reliefs -shareholder-level reliefs and firmlevel reliefs. Critical to this analysis, shareholder-level reliefs are restricted to private individuals, thereby excluding the possibility that the (rational) marginal shareholder could be a tax-exempt organisation. The VCT IPO market is, therefore, an attractive setting for study, given an expectation of investor homogeneity. Equally important to the research design is the fact that the value of some shareholder level reliefs can be readily modelled by reference to the age of the VCT. It is, therefore, possible to value the expected level of these shareholder-level reliefs at any stage in the life of a VCT and their time series properties. To the extent that individual VCTs' prices move in a manner consistent with these valuation paths, the conclusion that asset prices reflect taxation may be supported.
In order for any of the reliefs to be available, the Inland Revenue must approve the VCT. The terms of approval are given in S.70, Finance Act 1995, and are primarily concerned with the composition of the assets held by the VCT. After allowing a three-year period in which to identify and appraise potential investments, at least 70% of the VCT's investments must comprise new issues in unquoted trading companies.
Of this 70%, at least 30% must be in the form of equity, and the remaining balance may be preference or debt capital. In an attempt to ensure a diversified portfolio, no single holding may exceed 15% of the VCT's investments. In order to target investment at small, unquoted funds, there is an upper limit on the size of companies in which VCTs may invest. Immediately prior to investment by the VCT, the gross assets of the investment target company must not exceed £15m; and immediately after, they may not exceed £16m (prior to 6 th April 1998 the corresponding figures were £10m and £11m). The legislation specifies approved trades, in order to direct investment at risk taking activities which may, otherwise, experience difficulty in attracting investment, and to avoid allowing investment in relatively low risk assetbacked investment ventures.
In addition to increasing our knowledge of the workings and effectiveness of financial markets, analyses of the relationship between asset pricing and taxation can have a more direct public policy implication. By offering VCT taxation reliefs, the aim of the legislation is to encourage individuals to invest indirectly in small unquoted companies. Investment selection and monitoring is performed by the VCT, and a typical VCT holds investments in anything from less than ten to approaching forty companies (PACEC 2003 Individual investors may obtain a number of tax reliefs when investing in VCTs.
Original subscribers (but not secondary market purchasers) can obtain income tax relief at a rate of 20 percent on the cost of their original investment -referred to as "investment relief" for the purposes of this paper -conditional upon the shares being held by the individual for a required holding period. This required holding period was originally five years, but was reduced (non-retrospectively) to three years for seasoned and unseasoned issues occurring on or after 6 April 2000. If the shares are disposed of before the expiration of the required holding period a "clawback" of the 4 Discussions with VCT managers indicate, however, that VCT investors rarely consider exit strategy options at the time of initial subscription. This view is consistent with the findings reported in PACEC (2003) . Under general powers available to all limited companies (S.163, Companies Act 1985) a VCT can make market purchases of its own shares, thereby increasing market liquidity.
income tax occurs, based on the lesser of amount invested or disposal proceeds.
Additionally, a subscription to acquire VCT shares can, subject to certain conditions being satisfied, be used to defer a tax gain realised on a non-VCT asset when the gain is, effectively, reinvested in VCT shares. Following the introduction in UK Finance Act 1998 of taper relief (for capitals gains tax calculation purposes), the ability to defer a gain is now of less significance to potential investors -particularly in relation to gains on business assets.
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Further relief is given by an exemption from capital gains tax in respect of any gain on disposal of shares in VCTs, and by exemption from income tax upon dividends received from VCTs. For the purpose of this paper, these two reliefs are together referred to as "return reliefs". The return reliefs are available to all individual UK tax paying shareholders 6 , irrespective of whether they acquired their shareholding by direct subscription or by purchase in the subsequent secondary market.
Therefore, in subscribing for shares in a VCT an investor is acquiring four distinct assets or rights: (i) a share of the VCT's net assets; (ii) the right to investment relief;
(iii) the possibility of roll-over relief; and (iv) the right to return reliefs. Of these, the second and third cannot be acquired by a secondary market purchaser. 5 In his budget speech the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finance minister) announced on 17 th March 2004 a series a changes to the nature of the tax incentives. For shares issued on or after 6 April 2004 the rate of income tax relief for investments is to be increased from 20% to 40%; Capital Gains Tax deferral relief will not be available for gains reinvested in VCT; and the annual tax payer investment limits is to be raised from £100,000 to £200,000. These changes recognise that primacy of income tax related reliefs over gain deferral or roll over relief and are designed to increase the supply of funds into the VCT market. 6 Subject to an upper investment limit of £100,000 per fiscal year per individual.
Since a subscriber forfeits the right to investment relief upon selling VCT shares within the required holding period, and since investment relief may not be transferred to purchasers in the secondary market, we deduce that the secondary market in a VCT share will be characterised by high bid-ask spread (also known as "bid-offer spread") and low trading volume during the required holding period for that share. 7 A market maker will only offer to sell VCT shares for a price at which he / she can readily obtain (or replace) such shares in the market: this price will include, to some extent, an element reflecting the value of investment relief rights of original subscribers.
Potential purchasers, by contrast, will place no value on investment relief and will not be prepared to pay for it. Once the required holding period for the share is over, we may expect to see a more conventional bid-offer spread and trading volume until the VCT is liquidated.
We would expect, therefore, that the quoted prices for VCTs in the secondary market to comprise the following elements: (A) market value of underlying VCT assets; (B) conventional discount (or premium) upon the market value of underlying assets, as per the literature on investment trusts in general; (C) expected value of return reliefs;
(D) conventional marker makers' spread; and (E) spread attributable to the expected value of investment reliefs.
As at 6 th April 2002, sixty-eight VCTs had been listed on the LSE. Twelve of these had more than one class of share, thus giving a total of eighty VCT 7 In the view of a market maker, indeed, it appears that most of the trades during the required holding period were the result of distressed or probate sale.
quotations.
8 Table 1 analyses this population by year of issue. The apparent importance of the tax benefits to shareholders is evidenced in that 32 of the flotations occurred in either March or April, late in the fiscal year -reducing uncertainty over individuals' tax positions and marginal tax rates, and also minimising financing costs. 9 Based on a survey of 496 VCTs investors, "the single most attractive feature" of the scheme is the income tax relief based on the initial subscription (41% of investors) followed by the CGT deferral (23% of investors); the income tax exemption on dividends and the CGT exemption on disposal of shares in VCTs where described as "the single most attractive feature" of VCTs by 4% and 18% of investors respectively (PACEC, 2003) .
III. VALUATION OF VCT INVESTMENT RELIEF
We turn now to the formulation of a theoretical model for valuation of investment relief. The model is built up through a series of refinements.
First, consider an individual investor, UK resident for taxation purposes, who subscribes amount I in a VCT at time t 0 during fiscal year FY 0 , on which amount he / she expects income tax relief at rate T 0
First, Simple Model for Valuation of Investment Relief -Model (1)
The value of investment relief is not certain to the investor until the end of the required holding period since, for example, the investor's circumstances may change and he or she may become a distressed seller. We abstract from this point for the present, i.e. no account is taken of risk in valuing investment relief. Suppose that:
(i) the risk free rate is f per time period
(ii) personal taxation payable in respect of fiscal year FY i is due at time t' i (iii) the rate of interest upon tax 'clawed back' in respect of tax reliefs previously enjoyed but, retrospectively, no longer allowable is c per period
The cash flow benefit of investment relief is, therefore, IT 0 , to be enjoyed at time t' 0 .
The value of this investment relief to the investor in the period before he / she receives the cash flow benefit is the expected benefit appropriately discounted. In the period after receiving the cash flow benefit, but whilst still within the required holding period, the value is the potential liability for overdue tax (i.e. the cash outflow which will be suffered should the VCT holding be sold) 10 . Once beyond this holding period, the value disappears. More formally, the value of investment relief is: This leads to the following profile of investment relief valuation over time:
Second Model for Valuation of Investment Relief -Model (2)
We now take account of risk in valuing investment relief. Let r denote the rate per period which represents discount rate for risk appropriate to investment relief.
Certainty of relief occurs only at the end of the required holding period. Expression
(1) now becomes:
Which has the following profile of investment relief valuation over time:
Third Model for Valuation of Investment Relief -Model (3)
Models (1) and (2) fail to account for the fact that the VCT subscriber may divest him / herself of his / her holding (or part thereof) before the end of the required holding period for a price which is below the original subscription price (or relevant proportion thereof). In such a case the 'claw back' of investment relief is restricted to divestment proceeds at the income tax relief rate previously enjoyed, plus interest.
Therefore we consider what the proceeds of sale are likely to be in the context of market maker's bid or offer prices. The "standard market maker's spread" covers the market maker's transactions costs, adjustment for operational risk, normal profits, etc. Now the market maker must post bid and offer process upon which he is prepared to trade. It seems unlikely that a non-subscriber would want to buy VCT shares on the secondary market, but an offer price must be posted. Faced with a buy order, the market maker must obtain shares and cannot, in the normal course, rely upon finding a financially distressed seller willing to part with his VCT shares without being recompensed for the value of investment relief. Therefore the offer (as relative to the bid) price will include not only standard market maker's spread, but also a valuation of investment relief. Conversely, the market makers bid price reflects that fact that he anticipates selling VCT shares onwards on the secondary market to an investor who will not be able to enjoy, and therefore does not value, investment relief. Therefore, expression (2) needs to be re-stated as:
Notice that in the period prior to t' 0 no adjustment is made in respect of restricted claw back, since there is a zero assumed claw back during this period (the investor is assumed not to have claimed/enjoyed the cash benefit of investment relief).
Valuation of Market Maker's Bid / Offer Spread -Model (4)
The valuation of market maker's bid/offer spread (which we can observe) follows from the above as:
A further impactor upon the theoretical model might be the valuation of roll-over relief available to VCT subscribers. This may also be valued, along with investment relief, within overall market maker's spread, and abstracting from this may mean that model (4) under-estimates market maker's bid/offer spread. Roll-over relief value, however, is highly investor-specific and difficult to estimate. It is also likely to be, however, at least an order of magnitude lower than the value of investment relief (being the some discount rate in respect of payment deferral applied to a tax rate in turn applied to a principal sum).
Log model -Model (5)
Taking natural logarithms in (4) we obtain the model identity: For the VCT sample, the subscription date was established from the LSE Primary Market Fact Sheets and the date of the end of the required holding period deduced.
Where multiple allocations of a single VCT share class were made the date of the first was taken as the subscription date -in order to maintain an assumption that market makers are rational and would not wish to under value the spread. In practice further allocations of a single VCT share class involved a relatively small number of shares.
All VCTs in the sample were subscribed and allotted at a price of 100p per share.
For each trust in both the VCT and the comparator samples, the price spread was calculated for each day upon which bid and ask price data was collected:
Hypotheses
The special taxation treatments associated with VCTs, and the 6 th April 2000 nonretrospective reduction in required holding period from five years, provide a context in which we may formulate and test hypotheses concerning the valuation and market behaviour relevance of personal taxation considerations. The null hypothesis in each case is one of no such relevance.
Given valuation of investment relief by initial subscribers, we hypothesise that:
The bid-offer spread of VCTs within the required holding period is higher than that for conventional investment trusts.
Since investment relief is forfeit if a subscriber sells their VCT holding within the required holding period, and trades in this period are, therefore, likely to be infrequent:
The volume of VCT shares traded within the required holding period is lower than that for conventional investment trusts.
Since investment relief is certain for the subscriber as from the end of the required holding period:
The bid-offer spread of VCTs falls immediately at the end of the required holding period, and remains at lower levels thereafter.
From our modelling in Section IV, and focussing upon the magnitude (rather than merely the existence) of a pricing effect:
(D): The bid-offer spread of VCTs includes a valuation of investment relief which is characterised by the theoretical modelling in Section IV (above).
The value of investment relief, in the traditional asset valuation paradigm, is driven by future expectations and perceived risk. Therefore, given a shorter required holding period, ceteris paribus, the valuation of investment relief during the early period of a VCT will be higher. 
Methodology
We commence with consideration of VCT spreads over time, plotting mean daily spread against days to (since) the end of the required holding period, inspecting the profile with a view to identification of a structural break at the end of the required holding period.
We then consider in more detail descriptive statistics upon spread and volume data for our samples, segmented in various ways, and undertake comparison of means between various sub-samples. This includes descriptive statistics and comparable estimates for our comparator samples: although we may not assume that the comparators provide a perfect control, they are sufficient for the rather limited objective of comparing the general size of spreads and the amount of trading activity.
Finally, we undertake regression analysis aiming to model SPREAD, subsuming valuation of investment relief per our theoretical model(s). The objective of this analysis is to examine whether or not VCT spread evolves over the course of the required holding period in manner anticipated and also whether or not the spread for VCTs is influenced by other factors in a manner similar to that for other stocks / investment vehicles. This section now continues with discussion of development of our sample for regression purposes and of development of a reasonable, estimable regression model.
For thirteen VCTs, the assumed point at which the holder obtained the cash flow benefit of investment relief fell after the end of our sample period. Some basic descriptive statistics are provided for these VCTs but they were excluded from the regression sample leaving a population of fifty-three. In addition, many trusts (as expected) were not actively traded during their required holding period and, although some variation in the bid and offer prices was identified for all VCTs, there were a number for which there was little change in the spread over the required holding period. Those thirty-one VCTs for which there were less than thirty distinct changes in spread over the regression model estimation period were excluded from the regression sample (in order to ensure sufficient degrees of freedom for the estimation), resulting in a regression sample of twenty-two VCTs for which the spread does vary "sufficiently" within and, where relevant, beyond the required holding period, see table 1 for a reconciliation of the sample to population. Again some descriptive statistics are provided for the excluded VCTs, but no further analysis is reported. Since our theoretical model implies that the spread will evolve in a particular way over the course of the required holding period, there are competing interpretations for this finding of lack of variation in spread for certain VCTs. The first is that since some of these stocks are traded very lightly, market makers likely have an insufficient number of profitable trades to cover the costs of supporting the market. They may therefore set a high bid ask spread to close down the market, essentially encompassing the spread hypothesised from the previous section. A second explanation is that market makers do not consider the valuation of investment relief in determining the spread. Possible reasons for this are discussed further below.
As regards regression model, our theoretical model of the spread in logs, Model (5), suggests an estimable model of the following form to be estimated for each VCT: We must account also for other factors which may further affect the dependent variable, i.e. posited determinants of conventional market makers' spreads. Stoll (1989) decomposes the spread on stocks into three factors -those related to adverse information, to the costs of holding inventory and to costs of processing orders. This is corroborated by Glosten (1987) , who decomposes the spread into portions attributable to information asymmetry and 'other' elements (encompassing the factors of Stoll). Our estimates more closely follow the approach of Atkins and Dyl (1997) , who do not include an adverse information effect in their estimates of the spread. The existence of and ability to exploit informational advantages in VCTs is theorised to be relatively small. The stocks in which VCTs invest are frequently unlisted and the markets for listed securities in which they invest are often shallow. The directors of the VCT may be in a position to exploit informational advantages being better aware of the holdings of the VCT -directors' stockholdings are, however, typically very small and change only very rarely 11 . We therefore include only factors related to inventory and processing costs in the empirical model.
Atkins and Dyl (1997) model spread as:
where MVAL represents market value, VRET represents the variance of returns and ε is a stochastic error term.
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The greater the market value of the firm, the greater the assumed depth of the market and, consequently, the lower the inventory costs. Consequently the expected sign on the coefficient 1 β is negative. This model needs adaptation for our purposes because few VCTs are particularly large and the depth of the market is expected to change more with the performance of the VCT since inception than with the market value of the firm. The increased flows into high performing managed funds are well documented in the literature (see, for example Sirri and Tufano (1998) ). Therefore, price is taken as a proxy for willingness to buy and hence the depth of the market. The variance of the stock over the previous 30 days included as a measure of inventory costs, after Atkins and Dyl. Where available in our data set, other measures of market depth are included in the form of the number and volume of customer bargains in the previous 30 days.
This gives an estimable model as follows: was checked by re-running the estimations for a sub-set of VCTs using different assumed discount rates in the calculation of VIR -both below and above 4%: only when the assumed discount rate was particularly large did the results differ significantly from those reported).
In this regression, the a priori expected sign of the VIR and VB coefficients is positive, and that of the PB coefficient is negative. There are no firm sign expectations concerning the coefficients of BAR and VOL: albeit increasing depth of market would usually tend to decrease spread, in the present context the occurrence of trades might stimulate market makers' to increase spread.
Before estimation of the regression, we must be satisfied as to the time series properties of the variables. Many financial time series follow a random walk and this may be true of the PB variable. If market makers set the spread as a percentage of the bid price then the SPREAD variable itself might also be non-stationary. To evaluate the possibility that the variables are non-stationary, their time series were plotted and inspected; and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were conducted for all the SPREAD time series and for all other series where the times series plots suggested non-stationarity. 13 As expected, there were many cases where the bid price appeared to be of order of integration one (I(1)) and tested as such. There were also a few cases where the spread tested as I (1) Fortunately the solution in this context is relatively straightforward, since we are principally interested in the behaviour of the spread over the required holding period and so a short-run model is feasible. Therefore, we translated the regression model to be estimated in first differences, without affecting the interpretability and a priori sign expectations of estimated coefficients: No problems with bivariate or higher order collinearity were identified for this model; and the potential problem of introducing moving average error processes (and, hence, autoregressive errors) in the estimated model was not realised.
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V. RESULTS
Inspection of VCT Spread Data and Structural Break
If the tax position of holders is priced into the spread our theoretical model implies that, ceteris paribus, the spread will increase with time during the required holding period and that once this period has ended the spread will fall. Figure 3 plots the average spread for VCTs against the number of days prior to / after the end of the required holding period. On average, the spread appears to be increase over the required holding period, and then drops significantly at the end of the required holding period, entering a period of less obviously regular pattern.
As a further informal examination a linear time trend model was estimated using OLS, allowing for a structural break at the end of the required holding period in both slope and intercept. Both the estimated intercept and slope are significant at more than the1% level, and the model yields an R 2 of 0.55. A Chow test for structural break generates an F statistic of 1465 (as compared to critical F statistic of 4.61 at the 1% level of significance) and adds weight to our visual interpretation of Figure 3 .
This evidence is in line with our expectations and working hypotheses H 1 (C) and
H 1 (D).
14 Even where non-stationarity in the spread was rejected this was typically marginal -so it is unlikely that any induced autocorrelation was serious. Table 2 Panel A gives summary statistics upon the mean value of the SPREAD variable for our VCT and comparator samples. 15 The statistics are segmented between "all periods", then "prior to end of required holding period" and "after end of required holding period" (the last two being pertinent only to the VCT sample). Under "all periods" and "after end of required holding period", the only VCTs for which descriptive statistics are featured are those with five-year required holding periods, owing to the lack of availability, as yet, of data upon VCTs with three-year required holding periods beyond the end of their required holding periods. Table 2 Panels B and C follow descriptive statistics upon the mean value of SPREAD as a percentage of bid price, and mean number of customer bargains per day Table 3 shows the results of pertinent comparison-of-mean tests.
Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons
The mean absolute spread for all VCTs with a five-year required holding period is 19.2p, with average daily spread ranging between 4p and 59p. By contrast, and in line with expectation under hypotheses H 1 (A), H 1 (C) and H 1 (D), the UK venture / development investment trust sector has a smaller mean spread of 10.6p over the same period, albeit with higher standard deviation. For UK growth investment trusts, the spread is much smaller, as is the standard deviation and range. Since there are rather more growth than venture / development investment trusts within our sample, combining the comparator samples results in statistics more closely resembling growth investment trusts. 15 All of the VCTs in our sample were issued at a price of 100p per share, after which their prices evolved differently over time. Our theoretical model describes how the absolute size of the spread is expected to change over time, so this panel describes some of the properties of the dependent variable in the regression estimations which follow.
We expect the spread on VCTs to be larger during the required holding period (as compared to beyond it), in line with hypotheses H 1 (C) and H 1 (D) , and this confirmed by the lower half of Table 2 , Panel A. The mean spread for VCTs with a five-year required holding period is greater during that required holding period than it is across all periods. The implication that the spread is lower post required holding period is confirmed by a mean spread of 14p in the last row of (E) , is confirmed by a mean spread within required holding period of 31p for VCTs with a three-year required holding period. Given that there are relatively few VCTs within our sample which are approaching the end of their three-year required holding period, we excluded those time series observations for which there were two or fewer VCT spreads included and recalculated the mean. The removal of these "outliers" reduces the mean spread below the mean spread on VCTs within their five-year required holding period.
The price of our trusts are not constant over the sample period and this might naturally raise the concern that an interpretation of any differences in the absolute spreads will be misleading where market makers set spreads with regard, to some extent or other, of percentage of the instrument value. Therefore, descriptive statistics upon spreads as a percentage of bid price are calculated and presented in Table 2 we note that the spreads for VCTs are considerably larger than those for our comparator samples; that the spread for VCTs falls when the end of their required holding period is reached; and that the relativity in size of spreads remains as before.
We also note that, although the percentage spread for venture trust comparators remains larger than that for growth trust comparators, the difference is marginalsuggesting that market makers may indeed post spreads as a percentage of bid prices for our comparator trusts. Further, these spreads are of the order of magnitude that we might expect, being about 5%.
A further topic of interest is whether the volume of trading is relatively small for VCTs within their holding period as compared with after, and in comparison to more conventional instruments. Customer bargains per day are chosen as the basis for analysis since we are interested in the influence of tax effects on individuals' decisions (and including market maker bargains would not provide a basis on which to compare the effects of changing tax liability on private shareholders). Table 3 presents the results of formal tests of the difference between the means as discussed above. All differences are of the hypothesised sign, with one exception, and are significant at the 1% level. A commentary upon some of the key comparisons follows.
In the first row of Table 3 , Panel A we present a simple test for the difference between the mean absolute spreads of VCTs within their five and three-year holding periods respectively. Assuming independence, the difference in means of 10p is statistically significant at a 1% level, confirming our expectation that the spread on VCTs with a three-year required holding period will be higher (although when four outlying VCTs are removed the difference is reversed). The last row of Table 3 , Panel A presents a test of whether the spread for VCTs falls when their five-year holding period ends.
The difference of 7p is again of the expected sign and statistically significant at a 1% level.
Following the discussion of the statistics in Table 2 , comparison of VCTs and our other sampled trusts is more appropriate if undertaken for percentage as opposed to absolute spreads. Table 3 significantly greater than that of our comparators. This finding in isolation may merely indicate that the spread on VCTs will be greater than that on other trusts because the market is thinner, irrespective of whether the required holding period has ended (and, therefore, the market makers require a greater spread to cover higher inventor costs). This possible contamination is controlled for in our regression analysis (see below). Table 3 , Panel C provides results for which the number of customer bargains is compared for VCTs before as compared with after the end of their five-year holding period; and between VCTs and comparators. Although the mean number of VCT bargains is relatively small for both before and after the end of their required holding period, the number observed per day after the end of the required holding period is about three times the number observed per day before the end of the required holding period, with the difference statistically significant at the 1% level. Trading in VCTs is markedly thinner than that in the comparator samples, albeit this result, significant at the 1% level, is subject to foregoing caveats.
Regression Estimation
An earlier section discusses the development of the empirical model. The empirical model (10) was estimated for each of those VCTs for which there was sufficient variation in the dependent variable 17 , for the period from supposed cash benefit of investment relief until end of required holding period -that is,
i.e., the "middle section" of our model. Diagnostic results did not suggest significant problems with the regressions, the exception being a small number of models where data on the number of customer bargains and traded volumes were unavailable. The diagnostics for some of these suggested that there were potential miss-specification problems, although this was often marginal. No significant problems with serial correlation or heteroscedasticity were encountered.
All models suggested that the explanatory variables were jointly significant at greater than the 1% level. The level of explanatory power was generally high, with only four 17 Defined here as more than 30 changes in the spread over the estimation period. Typically, there was a great deal more variation in the spread for those VCTs in this sub-sample.
out of the 22 regressions having an adjusted R 2 of less than 10%. 18 Considering the variable ∆VIR, in all but two cases (where the estimated coefficient was not significantly different from zero) the estimated coefficient was greater than 0, significantly so in 18 cases. These results are robust to sign and significance on α,
suggesting that the results are not confused by the presence of a trend in the spread.
Most of the estimated coefficients of ∆VIR fall between the values 2 and 4, a little larger than the expected value of one. The qualitative nature of the regression results do not change if we alter the assumed discount rate for risk (as reported above), but the size of the ∆VIR coefficient might. Our results suggest that the discount rate is actually smaller than that assumed.
In all except one (insignificant) case the coefficient on ∆PB has the expected negative sign. All but one of these negative estimated coefficients is statistically significant at a 1% level. A further measure of inventory costs is the volatility in the instrument and, although there are fewer cases where the estimated coefficient on ∆VB is statistically significant, they are all of the expected positive sign where this is the case, again conforming to our expectations. Results for the coefficients on customer bargains and volume are more mixed, perhaps in part because we are unable to distinguish purchases from sales in the available data.
Spread does, therefore, evolve over time in the way that we expected as per hypothesis H 1 (E); and there is evidence that VCT spread responds to factors such as price and volatility in a similar fashion to other instruments. In general these results confirm that tax effects are priced into the spread and that price and trading behaviour in the VCT market conforms to theory and associated expectations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the current debate on tax capitalisation through an investigation of an income tax-induced "lock in" effect. The effect arises from conditional tax incentives provided to increase demand for Venture Capital Trust
IPOs that are listed on the London Stock Exchange. If VCTs are sold within a required holding period, then the main tax incentive -"investment relief" -is repayable by the vendor and is not available to subsequent secondary purchasers. The
VCT market provides an ideal setting in which to model and empirically test the lock in effect because the magnitude of the effect can be calculated with certainty without requiring access to confidential shareholder information. In addition, a further methodological opportunity is provided by an unexpected change in related taxation legislation (as regards length of required holding period). The modelling process employed focuses on the path of the VCTs' bid-ask spread over time during the required holding period -and by analysing the bid-ask spread rather than more typically mid-price, we overcome the typical lack of liquidity in the VCT market. As well as being a strength, however, the specific nature of the VCT market may potentially limit generalisation of the results.
Our results provide evidence that taxation considerations are reflected in the operation of the market. Theoretical modelling and regression analysis demonstrate that the bid-ask spread evolves over time in a way which is consistent with investment relief being capitalised during the required holding period (after the end of which the spread falls significantly). Consistent with the influence of the required holding period on investor behaviour, the number of customer bargains is minimal during the required holding period and increases significantly following expiration of the period. Spread is greater for VCTs with a three as opposed to five-year required holding period.
Further, although there are potential non-tax explanations, there is evidence that, as compared to our comparator investment vehicles, VCT spread is greater and trading volume less. In summary, our results provide clear evidence of tax related influences and in particular, tax capitalisation, in the market determination of equity pricing. 
